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WHY PAY ALIMONY?
John S. Bradway*
When a man loses his enthusiasm
for supporting his wife, two rules of
law exist to spur him on to renewed
endeavors. The first covers lapses
during the time the parties are living
together when there is at least a sem-
blance of family solidarity. The sec-
ond operates in cases arising after a
domestic breakdown due to separa-
tion, desertion or limited divorce and
until death or a court order finally dis-
charges the obligation. Although these
twin "persuaders" are venerable and
respected,' the second rule needs re-
vision.
In the English legal system the two
rules, their fundamental concepts and
their administrative machinery were
distinct. The common law courts ad-
ministered the first.2  The second ob-
ligation was the peculiar care of the.
ecclesiastical courts. They employed
spiritual, rather than temporal, con-
cepts. Marriage was a sacrament, a
status. Penalties were imposed be-
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Pennsylvania. Professor of Law, Duke Uni-
versity; Director, Legal Aid Clinic, Duke Uni-
versity.
The writer is indebted to Caron Stuart, a
student in the third year law class at Duke
University, for invaluable aid in the prepara-
tion of these footnotes.
3 Their sociological importance is attested by
reports on the customs of primitive tribes and
in early legal codifications. They were known
to Roman law and to the medieval ecclesias-
tical establishment. See Westermarck, A Short
History of Marriage (1926) c. VII; Corbitt, The
Roman Law of Marriage (1930) 127; 1 Black-
stone's Commentaries 355.
2 If the husband did not supply his wife with
necessaries, she might obtain them from third
persons and render him liable for their cost.
The commercial concept of the wife as the
husband's agent was employed. If the wife
cause of guilt, rather than a breach of
contract or a tort. Administrative ma-
chinery, including the confessional,
penance and excommunication, en-
forced court orders upon the con-
science, if not upon the person and
property, of the husband.
2
In the United States, where there
was no ecclesiastical legal system, the
traditional English concepts were ac-
cepted and we have been trying for
many years to execute them by the or-
dinary equity and common law proc-
esses. Even the statutes have framed
the picture in terms of "alimony." Our
courts insist that marriage is a contract,
but "sui generis." This provides some
judicial discretion.
Under the sheltering aegis of the re-
quirement that the husband support
his wife after a domestic breakdown,
the innocent, faithful wife, deserted
without legal justification by her anti-
social husband, has taken steps to se-
cure financial aid from her erring
was injured by third persons the husband
might sue on the theory that he was entitled to
her services, and recover damages for the loss
of these services. One thinks of an employer-
employee relationship with wages. Other situa-
tions in which the law allocated business con-
cepts to creep in were when the wife became
feme sole trader, or where her activities ex-
tended beyond those which might reasonably
be expected of a wife. The common law courts
thought of these aspects of the marriage re-
lationship in terms of the commercial contract.
3 When the ecclesiastical courts in England in
1857 surrendered their functions in this re-
spect to the common law courts, many of the
legal concepts were taken over bodily. [Matri-
monial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).]
The administrative machinery remained be-
hind. It has been something of a task to en-
force spiritual concepts through purely tem-
poral administrative machinery.
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spouse instead of casting herself upon
the charity of neighbors or the state.
At the same time mercenary and vin-
dictive women have cleverly trapped
men into the bonds of matrimony and
then employed the rule as an instru-
ment of extortion and blackmail. The
rule, in an unrestricted form, today
does enough damage to warrant a cri-
tical survey. Suggestions for improve-
ment will naturally follow.
A Test of Social Utility
Conditions of family life have changed
materially during the lifetime of the
rule, 4 and anyone, who assumes, with-
out fresh proof, that its effectiveness
is, today, as great as formerly, demon-
strates more placid devotion to prece-
dent than alert critical judgment. Con-
ditions surrounding modern marriage
contribute to family instability:5 In a
period when the wife is not necessarily
an economic asset to her husband and
society is not too shocked to receive a
woman living an independent life, if
domestic affection wanes, dissolution
seems a natural remedy. The psycho-
logical balance between two personali-
ties is easily disturbed. At such a time
the woman, listening to sympathetic
indignation from her friends, and clos-
ing her ears to impartial suggestions,
4For example, the modern home is seldom
the center of industry, and social life is en-joyed in clubs, motion picture houses, dance
halls, and automobiles. Mowrer, Family Dis-
organization (1927) c. VII. Young women now
make their own way in the world, and the
number of opportunities for them in industry
has increased amazingly. Groves and Ogburn,
American Marriage and Family Relationships
(1928) c. XVIL The functions of the family as
a social institution have shrunk until they in-
clude little more than the rearing of children,
an orderly adjustment of sex relations and a
device for holding property. Jacobs and Angell,
A Research in Family Lak (1930) 37-8. The
supervision exercised by church and family
may grasp, all too readily, the legal
weapon afforded by the instant rule.
But, a hasty, impetuous, emotional,
premature use by one spouse of the
sharpened blade of litigation may sever
unnecessarily, but permanently, what-
ever marital bonds remain, and thus
do irreparable injury to an institution
in which the state has an interest.
Similarly, if, for sentimental reasons,
the blow is withheld until the husband
has made good his escape, the family
is destroyed, and at the same time the
state may be saddled with the sup-
port of the wife. The rule is a vesti-
gial remnant of an earlier era, and
should be viewed -today with critical
caution.
The Unfairness of the Rule to the
Husband
In spite of the development of the
idea that women should have equal
rights with men, there still remain
many husbands who lament the passing
of the days of male supremacy in the
home. The husband's right to control
his wife, by force, if necessary,6 has
been appreciably curtailed.7 If he at-
tempted to exercise it today, in many
jurisdictions his wife could place him
in jail for assault and battery,8 or se-
cure a divorce from him on the ground
over the individual is greatly relaxed. Seagle,
Family Law (1931) 4 Ency. Soc. Sci. 81.
a1 Calhoun, Social History of the American
Family (1917) c's. 4, 9; Groves and Ogburn, op.
cit. supra note 4, c's. H, V.
6 State v. Black, 60 N. C. 274 (1864) (duty of
a husband is to "govern his household" and in
so doing "the law permits'him to use towards
his wife such a degree of force as is necessary
to control an unruly temper, and make her
behave herself . . .").
7State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485, 63 S. E. 145
(1908); Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise
Wife (1917) 23 Va. L. Reg. 241.
8 3 Vernier, American Family Laws (1935) 103.
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of cruelty.9 If he attempts to compel
her to live in a home of his choice, but
against her will, she may have her di-
vorce on the ground of constructive
desertion.'0 Her right to a divorce
from him is as broad as his right to
divorce her." She does not forfeit her
right to support and alimony unless she
does some act which will entitle him
to a divorce, and sometimes not even
then.12 His rights over his wife's prop-
erty have shrunk.'3  The legal concept
which entitles him to her services is
most obvious today in his right to re-
cover damages for injuries she may re-
ceiveY' Many wives bring no dowry
to their husbands.
His task in making a home in which
she will be content to remain is in-
creased by a number of factors. She
may legally set up a separate estab-
lishment of her own.15 There are stat-
utes protecting the health, and regu-
lating hours of work and conditions of
employment of women in industry.'(
Divorce, with remarriage to someone
who can offer her more of the things
she wants, is much simpler than it used
9 McDonald, Cruel and Inhuman Treatment
as a Grounds for Divorce (1926) 10 Marq. L.
Rev. 215.
'02 Vernier §§67, 115; Keezier, Marriage and
Divorce (1923) §334; Comment (1926) 11 Cor-
nell L. Q. 544.
"L 2 Vernier 8.
12 2 Vernier 266; Keezier, Marriage and Di-
vorce (1923) §672; Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass.
314, 318 (1871).
13 1 Vernier §§167-175; see also N. C. Const.
(1868) Art. X, §6 ("Property of married women
secured to them-The real and personal prop-
erty of any female in this state acquired before
marriage and all property, real and personal, to
which she may after marriage become in any
manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole
and separate estate and property of such fe-
male, and shall not be liable for any debts,
obligations, or engagements of her husband and
may be devised and bequeathed and with the
to be."7 If the grass in the adjoining
field looks greener to the wife, the task
of the husband, in persuading her to
remain in the home, increases.
Not only are the corresponding ad-
vantages of the husband declining. The
public conscience is raising the mini-
mum requirements as to what consti-
tutes a good husband. There are many
occasions when the shrewdly advised
wife may exercise control over her
spouse.'8 Domestic relations and family
courts 9 are improving the technique of
making him do what someone else
wants him to do. Regimentation of
husbands is no more popular than regi-
mentation of other individualistic
people.
The courts have expressed sympa-
thy for the husband who gains nothing
from the marital relationship except
the privilege of paying for the wife's
board and lodging.20 But all too little
has been accomplished in curbing cer-
tain well established "rackets" based
upon the rule in question. In an earlier
day the threat of scandal resulting
from a suit for breach of promise of
marriage persuaded many men to con-
writon assent of her husband, conveyed by her
as if she were unmarried").
14 Warren, Husband's Right to Wife's Services
(1935) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 622.
5 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1905).
16 See, for example, Consol. Laws of N. Y.
(Cahill, 1930) c. 32, §§146, 17, 182, 183, 445;
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §13005, 1008,
1009, 1011.
17 Mowrer, Family Disorganization (1927) c. II.
I Albertsworth, New Interests in the Law of
Torts (1922) 10 Calif. L. Rev. 461, 471-80; Mc-
Curdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Re-
lation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1036-56.
19 See bibliography on Family Courts in
United States, Dept. of Labor, Children's Bu-
reau, Bulletin No. 193 (1929) 71, Appendix B;
3 Vernier 139, n. 13; North, The Family Court
(1935) 19 Marq. L. Rev. 174.
20 See Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 102,
112 N. W. 481 (1907); Northrup v. Northrup,
200 Mich. 623, 166 N. W. 919 (1918).
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tribute money to ladies.2 1 In more
recent times, perhaps because divorce
is easier, and a divorced wife appears
more in need of protection than a jilted
fiancee, the alimony racket seems to
occupy a favored position.
The Unfairness to the Wife
The wife also is entitled to our sym-
pathy. There are many instances in
which the layman, judging her to be
deserving, feels his heart wrung with
pitiful stories of cases where in prac-
tice the rule has failed to function
leaving her in critical and destitute
circumstances.
The words "delay," "expense," and
"complexity of legal machinery" are
well known labels for long standing
popular dissatisfactions with the ad-
ministration of justice.2 2  If domestic
relations courts, in the few centers
where they are set up, help some of the
litigants over some of these hurdles,
they also place upon the shoulders of
the taxpayer, who supports his wife,
the duty of paying money to keep his
neighbor in line. In many places these
aids are not available.
Even if this court expense is justi-
fied, civil and criminal sanctions avail-
able to the judges are tools inadequate
21 Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart
Balm" (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 979; Comment
(1936) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 764.
22 Smith, Justice and the Poor (3d ed. 1924)
13-35; Ransom, Improving the Administration of
Justice (1920) 20 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 222.
2sColcord, Family Desertion and Non-Sup-
port (1931) 6 Ency. of Soc. Sci. 78; Feinsinger,
Observations on Judicial Administration of Di-
vorce Laws in Wisconsin (1932) 8 Wis. L. Rev.
27; 1 Marshall and May, The Divorce Court
(1932) viii.
24 Litigation, the legitimate offspring of trial
by battle, (2 Pollock and Maitland, History of
English Law (2d ed. 1923) 600) and with unre-
stricted murder as a distant ancestor, (3 Holds-
worth, History of English Law (1922) 311) pro-
to compel all husbands to pay support.23
Some flee the jurisdiction. Some stub-
bornly prefer to remain in jail. Some
have no property and refuse to work.
One thinks of Aesop's fable about the
contest between the wind and the sun
to see which could make the traveler
remove his cloak. The court, arnied at
present only with the instruments of
compulsion, is expected to secure re-
sults where cooperation is indicated.24
Existing Administrative Difficulties
A brief outline of the procedure fol-
lowed by a wife endeavoring to enforce
the instant rule will emphasize the ad-
ministrative difficulties confronting her
and will illustrate how in each step
designed to solve the incidental prob-
lem of support the foundations of
family solidarity are shaken.
Before any legal action is taken cer-
tain legally relevant facts are neces-
sary to justify the court in taking cog-
nizance of the domestic rift.25 These
facts may arise naturally in the course
of years, or they may be developed by
a malicious wife who nags her husband
in the presence of witnesses, and, when
she has amassed as much as her lawyer
deems necessary, rushes into court to
duces in the minas of present day litigants a
competitive desire to excel as if in a sporting
contest. The man sued by his wife for sup-
port may recall dimly some racial heritage of
male supremacy and conclude to insist upon
family discipline or call the whole thing off.
The result of the application of the legal sanc-
tions is, therefore, frequently to destroy the
spiritual bonds which, today, are the most
potent in holding the family together. The
court often must choose between these two
evils-non-support and complete family break-
down. The law in the field of domestic rela-
tions deals inevitably with personalities as well
as with events. It is not well equipped for
such a task.
25 3 Vernier §150, 161, 162.
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ask protection from a situation which
is the result of her own doing.
After the facts are gathered, in some
jurisdictions, there is a choice to be
made among several courts or several
legal processes. The wife who has
money or whose husband is financially
able to pay an attorney's fee may with-
out difficulty secure this guidance.
Others resort to domestic relations
courts where these exist. Legal aid so-
cieties and social service agencies have
in their files records of cases where
wives have failed to institute proceed-
ings or have discontinued those already
begun because the litigation procedure
frightened, bewildered, discouraged
and shocked them with its conflicts,
formality and publicity. Many lawyers,
police court judges and others in touch
with the problem know of women
whose fear of their husbands, or af-
fection for them, have created a sort
of paralysis.
After the court and the procedure
have been selected, it is a major prob-
lem to get and to keep the husband
within bounds. If he has property in
the jurisdiction the legislature may
render it subject to the court order.2.
But if he manages to conceal himself
or to get over the state line, the wife
does not always have the money neces-
sary to apprehenid him and secure his
return. Even if she has the money,
the usual result of bringing him back
is incarceration, not payment. In some
26 Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N. Y.
136, 164 N. E. 882 (1928) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a New York statute authorizing
the seizure of the property of an absconding
husband and applying it to the support of his
wife), afF'd, 280 U. S. 218 (1930). See note
1929) 29 CoL L. Rev. 669. Nine states have
already by statute given a deserted wife power
jurisdictions the statutes do not make
non-support an extraditable offense.2 7
In cases where the husband is in
court the procedure is, too often, a
mailed fist even when concealed in the
velvet glove of a modern domestic re-
lations court. The judicial discretion
implicit in such cases too often is exer-
cised according to the old concepts of
status or sin."8 Punishment is imposed
because of fault or guilt. The disturb-
ing effect of such sanctions upon a re-
lationship of personalities is self-
evident.
A court order may be enforced
against a willing or financially able
spouse. It may sometimes be executed
by frightening the defendant. But
where the husband is stubborn the case
resolves itself into a bitter battle be-
tween the wife and an outraged court
on the one hand, and a resolute hus-
band whose domestic affairs have
caused him to be branded a criminal.
This is a tragic result in a jurispru-
dence which claims to foster stable
family life.
A Tentative Suggestion
It is comparatively simple to find
fault with nearly any rule of law. One
who attempts to formulate a remedy
offers himself to make a Roman holi-
day. The value of the proposal need
not be judged by its ultimate accept-
ance as the ideal solution. If the sug-
under court supervision to manage, sell and
encumber the property of the absent husband
for the support of the wife and children.
27 3 Vernier §162.
28 See Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 145 N. W.
587 (1913); Foy v. Foy, 35 N. C. 90 (1851); Car-
michael v. Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211 Pac.
916 (1928); Keezier, Marriage and Divorce
(1928) 301.
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gestion -promotes discussion, it may
lead to a satisfactory answer, and thus
vicariously justify itself.
The present suggestion includes modi-
fication in the rule and in the admin-
istrative machinery.
1. Modifications in the Rule. Sev-
eral alternatives are available here. It
would seem quite radical to abolish the
rule entirely, though extreme feminists
and exasperated husbands might be
well pleased. Some jurisdictions have
attempted to balance the equities by
requiring the wife, if financially able,
to support her husband. But if the
rule is unsatisfactory one can scarcely
expect to cure it by increasing its field
of operations. The same criticisms may
be made against it in the enlarged state.
Still another- possibility is to whittle
away the scope of its operation by a
series of exceptions to cover unfair sit-
uations. The whittling process re-
quires easily recognizable boundary
marks, but it is difficult to find accu-
rate and valid distinctions in the field
of domestic relations. The events
leading up to a domestic breach are
of long duration, and involve innumer-
able complex inter-relationships and
repercussions, conflicts of personality
as well as legal events. If one attempts
to employ in the litigation process in
a modern common law court ecclesi-
astical yardsticks such as "fault,"
"guilt," "clean hands," "innocent
spouse," to decide whether a wife is
29 Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act 5814,
§6, 7 ("If any pauper, indigent, poor, incom-
petent, or incapacitated person, has kindred of
the degree of husband, wife, children (other
than minor), father or mother, brother or
sister, etc. . . . of sufficient pecuniary ability,
such kindred in the order above named shall
support such person by paying into the county
treasury of such county the sum per month
entitled to support from her husband
or not, there are well nigh insuperable
obstacles. The issues raised by these
yardsticks are not in the field of social
utility. The real question for the state
is, first, whether the family can be re-
habilitated and made again to function
as a going concern; second, if the fam-
ily is done for, what can be done for
its members. Such issues require
tests with labels in terms of "what is
best for the family," rather than "who
is at fault." The legally relevant facts
available under these older yardsticks
are so circumscribed that too often the
real issues in the case, in a social sense,
are distorted and cramped. The so.
cially relevant facts are too often un-
obtainable, legally inadiissible or so
imponderable as to defy accurate eval-
uation by a mind which has had only
the orthodox legal training.
One may have unshakable confidence
in the ability of a jury to answer a
single question of fact--did the defen-
dant strike the plaintiff on such and
such an occasion-and still doubt its
usefulness in striking a balance by a
complicated cost accounting system of
domestic debits and credits. There
was a time when "common sense" dic-
tated a medical treatment composed of
traditional spells, incantations, patent
nostrums and amazing elixirs. The
medical profession has taught us that
there are human problems too complex
for such simple devices. There* is no
fixed on by the board of supervisors . .
Consol. Laws of New York (Cahill, 1930) c. 49%,§125 ("The husband, wife, father, mother, grand-
parent, child or grandchild of a recipient of
public relief shall, if of sufficient ability, be
responsible for the support of such person.").
Similar sthtutes exist in Connecticut, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin.
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reason for the legal profession to over-
simplify the issues any more than to
employ the methods of the celebrated
Judge Bridlegoose.30
Dismissing all these suggestions, we
come to the present proposal which in-
volves the following steps:
A. Marriage has several aspects-
spiritual, physical, economic. The eco-
nomic aspect has received modern leg-
islative and judicial attention with re-
spect to married women's property
rights, but not enough with respect to
support and alimony. This phase of
it should be segregated and studied in
isolation.
B. Marriage as a sacrament or a
status was not bewildering to a me-
dieval ecclesiastical jurist. The legal
concept fitted into a social and eco-
nomic scheme in which the mutual
obligations for the spouses were both
clear and, in general, enforceable. But
the mutual obligations of modern
spouses are not so clear or enforceable.
Common law administrative machinery
is more effective in enforcing a con-
tract with business sanctions behind it
than a status in which spiritual values
are inextricably involved. If the obli-
gation of a husband to support his wife
can be isolated from the rest of the
status and a business sanction substi-
tuted the result may be a material gain
for the spouses with little or no dis-
turbance of the spiritual relationship.
C. A third difficulty to be removed
is the antagonism engendered by the
litigation process. Some other device
should be found which will enable the
so Guest, The Trial of Judge Bridlegoose, as
reported by Francois Rabelais (1923) 23 Rep.
Pa. B. A. 235.
-Harris, Essentials of a Valid Marriage
spouses to adjust their differences.
Let us first consider the substitution
of a new set of concepts. The marital
relation has been likened to a partner-
ship. It approximates more closely a
corporation because most marriages
must have the approval of the state
before they are valid"' and a divorce
may be obtained only by permission of
the state."2 If the legal concepts in
the economic aspect of family life were
expressed in terms now applied to a
corporation the subject would be
clearer and ready for critical study and
improvement.
A corporation deals with three
groups of persons-creditors, stock-
holders and employees. To the first
it pays its debts under well recognized
legal rules. To the second go divi-
dends in orderly fashion. To the third
are awarded wages for services ren-
dered. The economic relations of the
wife to the husband can be expressed
in terms of debts, dividends and wages
without doing violence to her legal
rights or his. If she brings to the mar-
riage money or property amassed else-
where, her rights in it may be defined
as those of a creditor. If she contri-
butes to the social or economic im-
provement of the family by extraordi-
nary services or skills a dividend could
reward her insofar as such imponder-
ables may be translated into material
values. But for her ordinary services
wages would seem a businesslike re-
turn.
The use of the wages concept has
been urged by many feminists,"3 but
(1900) 6 Va. L. Reg. 437, 511, 598.
322 Vernier §64.
33 Parkhurst, Is Feminism Dead? (1935) 237
Harper's Magazine 735.
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apparently not as a part of the analogy
between the family and the corpora-
tion. The market value of wages is
determinable.3 4 As long as the family
remains a going concern the wife's
wages ordinarily would be a matter of
domestic adjustment. But when The
family disintegrates, the wife's rights
might be protected by something like
unemployment insurance. 35
2. Modifications in Administrative
Machinery. There is nothing unusual
in utilizing the insurance device to
solve social problems. A long list of
precedents show that it is practicable
and that it has an inherent flexibility
which should make possible an adap-
tation to a somewhat novel situation. 6
The question is whether it can be
adapted to the domestic relations field.
An illustration will suggest some of
the administrative problems and bring
up tentative proposals for their solu-
tion.
Let us assume that an insurance fund
has been established with all the neces-
sary administrative details; that it
offers a policy or variety of policies of
insurance to husbands and wives prom-
ising to pay the wife a certain sum or
sums upon the event of the dissolution
of the family; that it will function
when the wife, unable to live ade-
quately upon the normal retuins for
her services in the home, is faced with
34 Handbook of Labor Statistics (1936 ed.)
1096-1115; Havighurst, Services in the Home
(1932) 41 Yale L. 3. 386.
35 See Unemployment Compensation (1936) 3
Law and Contemp. Prob. No. 1; Old Age and
the Welfare Titles of the Social Security Act
(1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. No. 2; note
(1936) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 386.
56 It is hardly necessary to mention the fact
that the insurance device has been employed
to protect groups of workmen from the hazards
an appeal to the charity of friends or
the public authorities administering the
poor laws; that the wife must elect
either the present system, or the in-
surance plan, but not both.
M and W, planning to marry, or
already married, and being convinced
that the possibility of domestic disso-
lution with the consequent unemploy-
ment of the wife for an uncertain pe-
riod is a contingency as worth guard-
ing against as the illness or death of
the breadwinner, the burning of the
residence or the theft of the family
possessions, come to the office of an in-
surance company and make application.
They have decided that it is more busi-
nesslike to accept the insurance pro-
tection than to rely upon the older
methods.
They desire to know, first of all, the
nature of the fund out of which the
insurance will be paid. Public37 and
private insurance funds, sustained by
premiums, by taxation and otherwise,
have engaged the attention of experts
in the field for a sufficiently long time
so that several working models are
available, any one of which geared to
the local conditions of a particular
jurisdiction, should offer adequate
service.
The second question will relate to
the cost of the protection. After a rea-
sonable period of experimentation it
which beset damage suits for injuries to them,
widows who had children to rear, groups de-
siring hospitalization and to distribute the cost
of other social and economic problems.
3748 Stat. 168 (1933), 12 USCA §264 (1935)(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 49
Stat. 620 (1935), 42 USCA §301 (1936) (Social
Security Act); 43 Stat. 1308, 1309 (1925), 38
USCA §§511, 512 (1928) (War Risk Insurance);
39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 USCA §751 (1927) (Em-
ployee's Compensation Act).
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is possible for any insurance company
to arrive at an actuarial figure for
premiums, on certain classes of risks.
While it is usual for the insured to pay
the premiums, it is not unknown for the
beneficiary to undertake the burden.
In cases where the individual does not
have sufficient funds to. meet the pay-
ments, group insurance, paid by the
employer,3 8 or a group of individuals
on a cooperative basis3 or even by the
state40 is not unknown.
The nature of the policy next engages
attention. This would be in the form
of a promise by the insurance agency,
public or private, to pay certain monies
in a certain manner upon the happen-
ings of the contingency. The amount
of the policy may be a matter for in-
dividual agreement. There is much
to be said, however, for the arrange-
ment, now in effect in workmen's com-
pensation policies, which provides for
a return to the beneficiary or his fam-
ily at a schedule based upon the wages
earned, and the nature of the disability,
whether temporary or total.41  The
manner of distribution of the money
upon the happening of the contingency,
whether in a lump sum or installments,
may also be the subjec of individual
preference. It is likely, however, that
the state may desire some voice in the
matter since the purpose of the plan is
to protect the public from the need to
pay for the wife's support. The dura-
tion of the liability of the fund, whether
for a term or an endowment basis or
38 Consol. Laws of New York (Cahill, 1930)
c. 661, §§90, 99 (workmen's compensation law).
s0Bamberger, Legal Aspects of Group In-
surance (1934).
40 Pub. Laws of N. C. (1936) c. 1, §14.
41 See schedule of payments for injuries due
otherwise, may be adjusted to fit the
particular family.
The next step is to make the appli-
cation. From a business standpoint
this is important because it presents
the facts which enable the insurance
fund to determine whether or not the
applicant is an insurable risk. It is
the practice of insurance companies not
to accept the application at its face
value, but to make a thorough investi-
gation of the applicant to prevent fraud,
and for other reasons. Hence one finds
physicians on the staffs of insurance
companies. Other business organiza-
tions also probe into the financial abil-
ity of a prospective customer, his credit
rating and other personal matters.
Some of the small loan companies of
the country employ a social worker to
aid in obtaining the social background
of the prospective borrower and to in-
vestigate any difficulties which occur
during the continuance of the loan.
In the light of these established prac-
tices there is little novelty in the pro-
posal that part of the application pro-
cedure for unemployment insurance
for the wife should be an investigation
by a trained social worker as to the
social stability of the family. There
seems no better way to determine
whether it is an insurable risk. The
technique of such an investigation is
well known to trained social workers,
and they are able to secure a maximum
of information with a minimum of an-
noyance to those being investigated.42
Experience should permit the erection
under Workmen's Compensation Act, N. C. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (mm).
42 Landis, If I Were a County Relief Director
(July, 1935) 71 Survey 208; Stinson, I am a
County Relief Director (Oct., 1935) 71 Survey
296.
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and maintenance of reasonable stand-
ards here as in other business rela-
tions. It is possible that during an ex-
perimental period the executives of the
insurance fund will require periodic
renewals of the application on which
occasions the fund may relieve itself
from liability in the event of fraud or
a threatened domestic instability. Dur-
ing the continuance of the policy there
may be occasional social investigations
and perhaps we may hear the slogan,
"See your social worker twice a year,"
just as we now find life and health in-
surance companies advising their
clients to have periodic conferences
with physicians and dentists. When
group insurance in this field has be-
come well established there may be or-
ganized supervision which will tend,
by preventive means, to keep families
from disintegration. The analogy is to
preventive work in the medical field.
The insured will look forward to cer-
tain contingencies: the ending of the
term when the contract will cease and
determine; the death of the husband
when the policy may provide a pay-
ment to the wife as in ordinary en-
dowment life insurance; the death of
the wife, when the policy may provide
an endowment return to the husband;
the continuance of the marriage for a
certain number of years, when an en-
dowment may be payable to both par-
ties. Such matters may render the
plan more attractive to individual
families.
What will happen when the family
breaks down? A break down may mean
a domestic quarrel, a desertion, or a
divorce. Through its periodic social
investigations the insurance fund
should have advance notice, and it is
assumed that all sorts of preventive
efforts will have been made. When the
contingency, in spite of everything,
does occur, the following steps are in
order:
1. A filing of a claim by the wife.
2. A social investigation of the
claim by the insurance fund.
3 The approval or rejection of the
claim.
If the claim is approved, payments will
be made at once. If it is rejected, the
wife may sue the insurance company,
presenting such facts as she may have
to support the contention that the con-
tingency has occurred and that it is
bona fide. From this point the pro-
posal merges with a litigation pro-
cedure and need not be discussed here.
This, roughly, is the plan both as to
theory and practice. Attention should
now be given to some obvious criti-
cisms.
Will the Plan Work?
Since it is unlikely that any plan will
meet a test of perfection, let us submit
the present proposal to two less exact-
ing measuring rods. (a) Does it meet
the more -serious inadequacies in the
present system? (b) What is the pub-
lic reaction regarding it likely to be?
On uncontested claims the proposed
plan should function on behalf of the
wife more speedily, less expensively,
and more simply than the present court
procedure. On contested claims, it has
two advantages over the present court
machinery. There will always be a
defendant within the jurisdiction of the
court who is able to pay a judgment
secured against it. The litigation will
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be between the wife and the insurance
company-not the wife against the hus-
band. There is no reason to assume
that claims against insurance com-
panies will be, in the long run, any
slower or more expensive or complex
than the present procedure. The ex-
pense would be borne in large measure
by the insured, and this should relieve
the taxpayer. There would be no oc-
casion to threaten the husband with
litigation, a prison sentence or any
other punishment. He would not be a
party to the litigation, at most only a
witness. The process should have little
disturbing effect upon family solidarity.
From the standpoint of the husband
the proposed plan is fairer than the
present system. He may elect to con-
tinue as at present or to protect himself
by insurance. In either event he will
embark upon marriage with a clearer
knowledge of its financial risks and
business obligations. His economic duty
to support his wife is discharged just
as are his payment to, the landlord, the
butcher, the baker and the candlestick
maker. While his power over the per-
son and property of his wife would not
increase, here is a definite check upon
her control over him and one which
permits of solution of differences of
opinion without dragging him into
court.
From the standpoint of the state the
proposal also seems satisfactory in that
it isolates, prepares for scientific study,
and disposes of economic problems of
marriage in a manner which does not
aggravate the relations of the spouses
or weaken whatever ties may still hold
them together. Yet there is nothing
perfect about it. Even though it ap-
pears good on paper, it may strike
snags in practice.
The first possible snag is the problem
of regimentation. Will people volun-
tarily submit their personal affairs to
investigation by social workers and
others, no matter how tactful and able?
There are several reasons why they
may. The applicant may come to be-
lieve that the business advantages of
the plan outweigh considerations of
privacy. Since, in an earlier day, in-
dividuals submitted to supervision by
families and church officials, the pro-
posal is not novel, rather it is a return
to fundamentals. If standards of living
were more clearly defined and the
causes of breakdown statistically pre-
sented, individuals might be aroused
to a sense of pride in keeping the rate
of marriage dissolutions in their home
community at a lower rate than in the
neighboring city.
A second snag is the possibility that
frauds may be perpetrated upon the
fund so extensive and ingenious as to
discourage its operation. It is difficult
to see how such frauds would be
greater than those now attempted in
other forms of insurance. Since they
are being met and insurance companies
still show a profit, it is likely that in-
genuity, backed by an enlightened self
interest, will find a solution. The social
work investigation should reduce the
possibility of fraud to a minimum, and
the offenders could be prosecuted crim-
inally with more effect than a wife can
bring to bear upon her husband.
A third snag is the possibility that
romantically inclined persons will re-
sent what may appear to them a com-
mercialization of the marriage relation.
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If this were the only occasion dragging
the domestic intimacies before the light
of publicity, the argument would be
stronger. Domestic matters are spread
abroad in the columns of every news-
paper and many magazines. Court
proceedings receive wide attention. A
generation which has learned to dis-
cuss sex without distress of mind or
spirit, and to seek aid from advice-to-
the-lovelorn columnists is not likely to
be frightened by the instant proposal.
When an engagement is announced in-
surance agents flock to the prospective
bridegroom and discuss with him such
dismal subjects as death, illness, acci-
dents. Since young love can see a busi-
ness value in protecting the family
from such sipectres, it would seem that
there is nothing scandalously shocking
in the suggestion that protection should
be afforded the wife, if a family dis-
solution should occur.
The fourth snag is the possibility that
the proposed device will free the hus-
band from a sense of obligation to his
family, and that a general exodus will
ensue. There seems to be no real rea-
son to fear such a catastrophe. While
the present proposal is not intended to
solve the whole problem of family dis-
integration, it is not so revolutionary as
to upset established habits. The pro-
posal is voluntary, not compulsory. If
43 Lawyers may be concerned over the pos-
sible loss of large fees now occasionally obtain-
able in such cases. It would seem that a small
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the husband and wife do not elect it,
there are still the existing rules and
machinery. If they take the insurance
it does not necessarily mean that they
abandon all marital ties. No doubt
some men will seek their freedom who
today are restrained by a fear of the
consequences. Yet one cannot call-this
an unmitigated evil. A family held to-
gether" only by fear is not a healthy
social organism such as the state de-
sires. How can it perform adequately
the tasks which the state requires of it,
such as the rearing of children?
Conclusion
We have now considered a rule of
law, criticized it, and suggested a rem-
edy. A word should be said as to the
manner of putting the remedy into
effect. Two steps are required to estab-
lish the system: (a) A statute de-
claring a policy, abolishing the status
concept, substituting a series of busi-
ness principles. The statute should set
up a fund and provide for its operation;
allow families to elect the present sys-
tem or the proposed system, but not
both. (b) Sufficient experimentation
to secure experience in the administra-
tive details.
The proposal is no panacea, but there
is something to be said in its favor.4 3
fee in the hand might well be worth two large
ones in the bush. In many of these cases today
there is no chance for a fee.
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